A discretionary monetary policy leads to sub-optimal stabilization in models with the New Keynesian assumption of forward-looking price setting, and various policy rules that improve the discretionary equilibrium have been considered in the literature. The empirical evidence for forward-looking price determination is mixed. This note shows, however, that forwardlooking price setting is not essential for the results. Policy rules that improve welfare under the New Keynesian assumptions, also do so within a traditional backward-looking model if asset prices, such as the exchange rate, are forward-looking.
Introduction
The New Keynesian monetary policy literature on credibility and commitment, cf. the survey by Clarida et al. (1999) show that with forward-looking price determination, the discretionary equilibrium is sub-optimal even in the absence of an overambitious output target. When supply shocks occur, commitments regarding future policy can affect equilibrium in a favorable way by credibly affecting price setters' expectations. An important strand of this literature considers various policy rules that improve welfare relative to the discretionary equilibrium.
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The key equation that drives the results is the "New Keynesian Phillips curve", which states that current inflation depends on the output gap (or some other measure of marginal costs) and expected future inflation. The New Keynesian Phillips curve is clearly attractive on theoretical grounds, since it can be derived from optimal behaviour. The approach is less vulnerable to the Lucas critique than backward-looking price determination, employed for instance in Ball (1994 Ball ( , 1999a , Svensson (1999) , Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) and Taylor (1999) . On the other hand, the empirical evidence for the New Keynesian Phillips curve is mixed. Gali et al. (2001) , Sbordone (2002) and others have found that the forward-looking element in the Phillips curve is important. Fuhrer (1997) finds, however, that expectations of future prices are empirically unimportant in explaining price and inflation behavior. Roberts (1998) and Roberts (1997) argues that the New Keynesian Phillips curve fits reasonably well when estimated on survey data on expectations, but does not fit well when rational expectations are imposed. He thus advocates a prominent role of a backward-looking term in the Phillips curve. Ball (1994) and Mankiw (2001) argue that the New Keynesian Phillips curve yields theoretical implications at odds with reality. For example, the New Keynesian Phillips curve implies that a fully credible disinflation should cause an economic boom.
1 Clarida et al. (1999) show that a "conservative" central bank improves welfare. Woodford (1999) identifies a lack of "history-dependence" in monetary policy as the principal policy imperfection under discretion and shows that both price level targeting and interest-rate smoothing generates such inertia. Jensen (2002) introduces inertia through a targeting rule based on the growth of nominal income. Walsh (2003) considers targeting the change in the output gap and finds that this tends to be superior to targeting the growth of nominal income. Söderström (2005) considers a money growth target. Bårdsen et al. (2002) perform econometric tests of the New Keynesian Phillips curve applying the encompassing principle and find that the forward-looking term of the New Keynesian Phillips curve is rejected when other explanatory variables are included in the model.
Since there is disagreement about the empirical relevance of the New Keynesian Phillips curve, the aim of this paper is to examine whether policy rules that perform well under standard New Keynesian assumptions also do so under more traditional assumptions of economic behaviour. A main result is that the policy rules proposed within a New Keynesian framework are robust as long as one takes into account the openness of the economy. Although there is disagreement about the degree to which price setting is forward-looking, it is generally accepted that asset prices, such as the exchange rate, are forward-looking. As shown in Leitemo et al. (2002) , the forward-looking exchange rate channel generates a timeinconsistency problem in monetary policy stabilization. In the present paper, we analyze whether the policy rules proposed in the literature mentioned above also contribute to reducing the time-inconsistency problem stemming from a forwardlooking exchange rate. The proposals from the New Keynesian Phillips curve literature is shown to improve the discretionary equilibrium also in our model, which suggests that the performance of the proposed rules are less model specific than one would think.
The model
Open-economy models with forward-looking behavior have been developed by Batini and Haldane (1999), Svensson (2000) , Smets and Wouters (2002) and others. In order to isolate the effect of a forward-looking exchange rate channel and clarify that our conclusions do not rest on forward-looking price and output determination, we choose a model specification where the exchange rate is the only forward-looking variable. The model by Ball (1999b) , which is an extension of Svensson (1997) and Ball (1999a) The preferences of society (the government) are represented by the following intertemporal loss function:
where δ is the discount factor and L t+τ is society's period loss function, which is 2 See the appendices in Ball (1999b) and Leitemo (2004) for derivations of equation (2) under different assumptions.
3 We do not include a foreign real interest rate due to the assumption of a small open economy which makes the foreign economy exogenous and hence will not affect the qualitative conclusions of the analysis.
given by
(2.5)
The period loss function is assumed to be quadratic in the deviation of inflation from the desired rate of inflation and in the deviation between actual and potential output. The weight λ measures the weight attached to output stability relative to inflation stability by the society. It can be shown that the loss function (2.4) and (2.5) approaches a value proportional to
when the discount factor δ approaches unity. For simplicity, we will thus consider (2.6) when evaluating alternative policy rules. As in Ball (1999b) , we assume that the instrument of the central bank is the short-run real interest rate r t . 4 The objective of monetary policy is to choose a path for the interest rate that minimizes the expected loss.
Monetary policy rules
In the basic New Keynesian framework with forward-looking price setting, surveyed by Clarida et al. (1999) , there is a difference between the case of discretion and the case of commitment to an optimal rule. Under commitment, the initial interest rate response to a cost-push shock is weaker, but the interest rate is kept above neutral for a longer period than under discretion. The reason why this is improves welfare is that when price setters are forward-looking, a prolonged period of tight monetary policy weakens the reason to increase prices in the first place. Initially, the central bank therefore faces a more favorable output/inflation tradeoff. Leitemo et al. (2002) show that the same lack of inertial response to cost-push shocks under a discretionary monetary policy also holds in the open-4 It could be more natural to let the short-term nominal interest rate, rather than the real interest rate, be the policy instrument. This would, however, not change the results. The difference can be interpreted as the central bank adjusting the nominal rate in order to achieve a given real interest rate.
economy model with backward-looking price setting due to the exchange rate channel of monetary policy. When foreign exchange market participants anticipate a prolonged period with a positive interest rate differential, this leads to a larger appreciation of the exchange rate for a given interest rate differential today. This dampens the effect of the domestic cost-push shock on CPI inflation, and inflation is brought back to the target more quickly. When demand shocks occur, however, a discretionary policy is characterized by too much inertia. The reason is that the appropriate monetary policy response would be to offset the demand shock while affecting the exchange rate as little as possible. Since a noninertial interest-rate response causes the smallest response to the exchange rate, interest-rate inertia will be inefficient when responding to demand shocks.
In the literature on credibility and commitment, two general approaches for improving the discretionary equilibrium have been considered; the "instrument It is well understood that a central bank that places greater weight on the inflation target than society does, that is, a "conservative" central bank, improves the discretionary equilibrium when the output target is overambitious. The case for a conservative central bank does not, however, necessarily hinge on an overambitious output target. Clarida et al. (1999) showed that delegation to a conservative central bank improves the discretionary solution if there is positive autocorrelation in supply shocks. This result also holds without such autocorrelation as long as the Phillips curve is partly backward-looking, as shown by Jensen (2002) .
Although a conservative central bank does not directly imply inertia in monetary policy, which characterize the optimal response to supply shocks, it contributes to reducing the output stabilization bias under discretion and thus tends to improve the discretionary solution. Woodford (1999) showed that introducing inertia through interest rate smoothing improves the discretionary solution. Another way to introduce inertia is to include the growth of nominal income in the loss function, as proposed by Jensen (2002) . Walsh (2003) considers the change in the output gap, and finds that this tends to be superior to targeting the growth of nominal income. Söderström (2005) considers a money growth target and compares its performance with other targeting rules including the ones mentioned above. He finds that targeting the change in the output gap or nominal income are more efficient ways than money growth targeting to achieve an appropriate inertia in monetary policy.
We restrict our analysis to consider variants of the following loss function: Note: (a) the weight is constrained to be non-negative.
last term in (3.1) when all the weights are optimized is that it includes the product of π t and ∆y t . Thus, by including a term with the growth of nominal income in addition to the terms on π t and ∆y t separately, we allow the covariance between inflation and output growth to be taken into account.
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The inclusion of uncovered interest rate parity and rational expectations makes the analytical solution intractable. As is common in the literature on monetary policy in dynamic rational expectations models, the results are derived numerically. is set at λ = 1. Before comparing the alternative rules, it is worth noting that the optimized optimizing the weight on the supplementing variable.
weights in the pure targeting rules are all strictly positive. Thus, all the rules considered improve the discretionary equilibrium. The type of targeting rules that have been shown to improve the discretionary equilibrium in the New Keynesian theoretical framework are therefore robust in the sense that they also improve the discretionary equilibrium in a predominantly backward-looking model, but with a forward-looking exchange rate.
Among the pure versions of the targeting rules, a conservative central bank produces the lowest loss. The loss under a conservative central bank comes even close to the loss in the optimal commitment case. Interest rate smoothing and output growth smoothing, however, perform only slightly better than a pure discretionary policy. In the optimal targeting rule, where all the weights are optimized, the weights on interest rate smoothing and output smoothing are zero. The optimal targeting rule is almost identical to the conservative central bank. This suggests that in our baseline parametrization, reducing the weight on output is relatively more efficient than introducing more inertia in monetary policy. However, as discussed above, the degree to which inertia in monetary policy improves the equilibrium depends on the relative magnitudes of cost-push shocks versus demand shock. In the baseline case, the standard deviations of each shock were set to 0.5. In Figure 1 , we plot the expected loss relative to the loss under commitment for the alternative rules under various configurations of the volatility of demand and cost-push shocks, where we restrict the sum of the standard deviation of demand shocks and the standard deviation of cost-push shock to be equal to unity. We see that the gap between the discretion case and the targeting rules becomes wider the higher the volatility of cost-push shocks relative to demand shocks, confirming that the gain from the targeting rules increases when cost-push shocks become more dominant. 
Conclusions
The 
